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Abstract 
 
This article explores the background to the decision in Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 
SA 593 (SCA), some of its conceptual content and its broader 
implications for future jurisprudence in regard to the 
interpretation of documents. It illustrates the reality that in the 
past interpretation in different areas of the law was undertaken 
in accordance with differing standards even though all areas 
involved the interpretation of language in common everyday use, 
and questions the need to approach issues of interpretation in a 
way different from that used in conventional language. The 
internal inconsistencies of past authority are highlighted, as well 
as the trend in South African jurisprudence and overseas 
towards a single, simple and coherent approach to 
interpretation. The importance of recognising the role of both text 
and context is stressed, and the identification of relevant context 
in interpreting contracts and statutes is addressed. The article 
identifies two animating principles underlying the approach to 
interpretation in Endumeni, viz.: the discipline it imposes on 
judges to explain their decisions in regard to interpretation rather 
than starting with an a priori meaning and buttressing it with 
authority, and the desirability of a single, clear and simple 
standard by which to approach issues of interpretation. 
Keywords 
Endumeni; background; effect; interpretation; text; context; 
objective iterative process; context; sensible construction.  
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1 Introduction* 
When I was a law student our curriculum outwardly included only one 
course dealing with interpretation, that being "Interpretation of Statutes", 
where our text was Steyn's Uitleg van Wette, then in its third or fourth 
edition. The rule, so we were told, was that statutes should be given their 
literal meaning, but that courts could depart from this if the literal meaning 
would result in an absurdity. In a country where much of the legislation 
affecting the population seemed absurd, this was difficult to comprehend, 
even in those far-off times.  
The curriculum's outward appearance that interpretation related to statutes 
alone was misleading. In the course on contract we were introduced to what 
appeared to be a different rule, that contracts should be interpreted in 
accordance with the intention of the parties and the plain meaning of the 
words in the contract. To this was added the rider that evidence of the 
negotiations between the parties and, if they had taken the precaution of 
reducing their contract to writing, parol (which meant oral, although no-one 
told us that) evidence of their intentions, was strictly inadmissible. Nothing 
was said about the vagaries of interpreting oral contracts as opposed to 
written ones. 
In case this confusion was insufficient, the law of succession involved an 
extensive foray into the rules for the construction of wills, where we were 
sent in search of the intention of the testator and warned of the shades of 
testators long dead who awaited us when we disappointed their 
expectations. Fortunately, being only students, we were not taken to the 
niceties of construing patent specifications or judgments. Those were 
delights that still awaited us. 
The subject that we did not discuss was why our interpretation and 
understanding of legal documents of any type was, or should be, any 
different from the approach that we habitually adopted to other documents 
couched in a language with which all of us were familiar. Part of our daily 
existence involved reading books, newspapers, magazines, journals of 
                                            
*  Malcolm Wallis. B Com LLB (Natal) PhD (UKZN). SC, Judge of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, Honorary Professor of Law in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa. E-mail: mjdwallis@gmail.com. I am grateful to Nondumiso Phenyane and 
Dimakatso Ramaisa, both researchers at the SCA, and Amy Sinclair, an intern 
researcher at the SCA, for their research assistance and input in relation to the first 
draft of this article. Responsibility for it is mine alone. The article is a revised version 
of an address given at the University of the Western Cape on 23 March 2018 as the 
keynote address at a conference on legal interpretation. 
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varying types and other expressions of the written word. We approached all 
of those with little need for special rules of interpretation to enlighten us as 
to their meaning. Of course, we were well aware of ambiguity of meaning, 
the pitfalls arising from the misuse of language and the different character 
of different texts. No instruction was necessary in order for us to understand 
that a dictionary was different from a novel, or that a textbook sought to 
convey information and thoughts with a degree of precision absent from a 
newspaper or popular magazine. Yet as law students all this went by the 
board and we were inducted into the mysteries of legal interpretation. 
2 Rules and reality 
Trying to apply these rules of interpretation in courts over many years as an 
advocate proved troublesome and the rules seemed more fluid and less 
certain in their application the longer I practised. This can be illustrated by 
way of two examples. Recently, while taking some of the SCA researchers 
on a tour of the court, one asked whether I remembered my first appearance 
there. I did,1 and it was about  a question of law reserved in a criminal appeal 
on the meaning of the definition of "aggravating circumstances" under the 
Criminal Procedure Act.2 My client had been convicted of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances, where the victim of the robbery had been 
threatened with a knife during the robbery. The problem was that there were 
two accused and the State could not show which one produced the knife or 
whether the other robber even knew that his partner in crime had a knife. 
So there was no common purpose in regard to the aggravating 
circumstances. 
After the initial insertion of the definition into the Act, Schreiner JA doubted 
whether the doctrine of common purpose could be invoked to justify a 
finding of aggravating circumstances, or whether such circumstances had 
to be found individually for each accused.3 This prompted an amendment to 
the definition, which, the Minister of Justice explained in parliament, was 
intended to make it clear that the doctrine of common purpose could be 
used to make a finding of aggravating circumstances. Thereafter in Cain the 
Appellate Division held that Schreiner JA's doubts in regard to the original 
definition were misplaced,4 thereby rendering the amendment unnecessary. 
In my case the trial judge used the amendment to justify the conclusion that 
                                            
1  S v Dhlamini 1974 1 SA 90 (A). 
2  Then Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, but the same definition appears in s 1(1)(b) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
3  R v Sisilane 1958 2 SA 448 (A) 451H, 453G.  
4  R v Cain 1959 3 SA 376 (A) 381. 
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if aggravating circumstances were present in respect of any one accused, 
all of them should be found guilty of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances, even though there was no common purpose in regard to the 
aggravating circumstance. Whether he was correct was the question of law. 
Although I had read it, I was not permitted in argument to refer to the 
Minister's speech, because at the time (and possibly still) that was 
inadmissible. I submitted that the sole purpose of the amendment was to 
resolve Schreiner JA's doubts, which had in any event been dispelled by 
Cain. This was rejected and the court held that the plain meaning, and the 
intention of the legislature, in the amended section was that conduct 
constituting an aggravating circumstance on the part of one of the accused 
required a finding of aggravating circumstances against all of the accused, 
even if they lacked common purpose in relation to the aggravating 
circumstance. The result was that an amendment to ensure that common 
purpose applied to findings of aggravated circumstances resulted in a 
judgment that it was inapplicable and unnecessary.5 That had serious 
implications because robbery with aggravating circumstances carried with it 
a potential death penalty, and it now carries with it a minimum sentence of 
15 years imprisonment in the absence of substantial and compelling 
circumstances warranting a lower sentence. The application of the plain 
meaning rule and the endeavour to ascertain the intention of the legislature 
resulted in the court arriving at a conclusion diametrically opposite to that 
intended by parliament. 
This was an introduction to the potentially unjust effect of applying the rules 
of interpretation that I had been taught, but belief that the plain meaning rule 
would always prevail was dispelled in a subsequent appeal that I argued.6 
It involved a contract for the construction of civil works and the amount to 
be paid to the contractor. A clause in the contract provided that:7 
… if the net effect of all variations as valued ... shall be found on completion 
of the whole of the works to have resulted in a reduction or an addition greater 
                                            
5  Sadly, when the Constitutional Court was afforded the opportunity of remedying this 
fundamental affront to the basic principles of criminal liability it endorsed the finding 
in Dhlamini and held that it was constitutionally compliant. Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development v Masingili 2014 1 SACR 437 (CC). The rule against the 
admissibility of parliamentary materials has (controversially) been abolished in 
England (Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (HL)), but not yet authoritatively in South 
Africa (S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 14 and 15). However, there is 
no indication that the Constitutional Court examined, or gave any consideration to 
examining, the parliamentary material before deciding Masingili. 
6  Melmoth Town Board v Marius Mostert (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 718 (AD). 
7  Melmoth Town Board v Marius Mostert (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 718 (AD) 726 C-D. 
Emphasis added. 
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than 15 per cent of the sum named in the tender … the amount of the contract 
price shall be further increased or decreased by such sum (if any) as in the 
opinion of the engineer shall be reasonable ….  
There had been an addition to the contract price of more than 15 per cent, 
but the engineer had tried to reduce the contract price, not increase it. I was 
for the contractor and, pardon the pun, the plain meaning rule was plainly 
on my side. If there had been a reduction or addition to the tender price 
greater than 15 per cent, the contract price was to be "further increased or 
decreased". On any usage of the English language something can only be 
"further increased" if it has already been increased, and it can only be further 
decreased if it has already gone down. Undeterred by such niceties, the 
court ignored the word "further" and held that the "manifest purpose of the 
clause was to enable the engineer to adjust the price either upwards or 
downwards", largely because it couldn't imagine why the person who 
drafted the clause would have imposed such a limitation on the engineer. 
The obvious reason that the drafter was not as clever or imaginative as the 
members of the appeal court did not occur to them. It was some consolation 
that I nevertheless won the appeal on a different point. 
There were reasons therefore for being a little cynical about suggestions 
that words are to be given "their ordinary grammatical meaning",8 or that the 
intention of the parties or the legislature is to be sought and respected.9 
Experience taught that this was not how judges and courts went about the 
process of interpretation, whether of contracts or statutes. So, when in 
Coopers & Lybrand10 the proper approach to interpretation was summarised 
as being that one should first "ascertain the literal meaning of the words" 
and thereafter have regard to context and background circumstances, 
applying extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances when 
                                            
8  An idea drawn from Lord Wensleydale's oft-cited Golden Rule (Grey v Pearson 6 H 
L Cas 106) that: "In construing wills and, indeed statutes and all written instruments, 
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that 
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of 
the instrument." Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26 31; Crispette 
and Candy Co Ltd v Oscar Michaleis and Leopold Alexander Michaelis 1947 4 SA 
521 (A) 543; Kalil v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1967 4 SA 550 (A) 556C-E. 
The proposition is still occasionally mentioned, but almost inevitably followed by a 
reference to the importance of context. Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 
474 (CC) (hereafter the Cool Ideas case) para 28. I am not alone in my cynicism, 
see Jansen 1981 TSAR 102-103. 
9  See, for example, the convoluted endeavor to explain the plain meaning in 
accordance with the intention of the legislature in Summit Industrial Corporation v 
Claimants against the Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the MV Jade 
Transporter 1987 2 SA 583 (A) 595I-596F. 
10  Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 3 SA 761 (A) (hereafter the Coopers & Lybrand 
case) 768 A-E.  
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encountering ambiguity, courts were being asked to engage in an artificial 
process. That is not how human beings read documents or seek to 
understand their meaning. Nor was it the way in which judges interpreted 
statutes or contracts. 
Let me give an example. When a passing motorist sees a newspaper poster 
proclaiming "BULLS GORE SHARKS", their understanding does not start 
with their thinking that literally it means that male bovines somehow 
encountered a school of aquatic animals and savaged them with their horns. 
Nor would our hypothetical motorist then examine context, of which there 
would be precious little in relation to a newspaper poster displayed on a 
lamppost, and conclude that the literal meaning is absurd so that they could 
resort to extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances to discern its 
meaning. I venture to suggest that the vast majority of South Africans would 
read it and understand instantly that it referred to the result of a game of 
rugby. But that would be because from the outset they factored into their 
understanding the whole of the relevant context – the nature and purpose 
of the poster, the day of its appearance after a weekend, interest in the 
game of rugby and their own knowledge of the local participants in the 
game. 
3 The path to Endumeni11 
Coopers & Lybrand was itself internally inconsistent. It cited12 the judgment 
in Cape Fabrix,13 where Rumpff CJ said that words should not be clipped 
out of the document and placed on a clean piece of paper and their meaning 
determined, but that they should be examined in the light of the nature and 
purpose of the document and their situation in the document as a whole. 
Having quoted that very passage, Joubert JA went on immediately 
thereafter to say that looking at the context should occur "after having 
ascertained the literal meaning of the word or phrase in question". Which 
was it to be? The answer was opaque, if any answer was to be found. 
All of this illustrated the tug of war that had gone on for many years between 
literalists and contextual interpreters and identified by Schreiner JA in Jaga 
v Dönges.14 There can be little surprise that, after the decision in Coopers 
& Lybrand, the case law went back and forth between these two poles. The 
                                            
11  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 
(hereafter the Edumeni case). 
12  Coopers & Lybrand 767I-J. 
13  Swart v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 195 (A) 202C. 
14  Jaga v Dönges; Bhana v Dönges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 662G-663A.  
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result was an absence of clarity about the process of interpretation and 
judgments became something of a "pick and mix" selection, where judges 
could find authority supporting whatever approach they wished to take in a 
case. So Judge A would find the wording clear and say that the context was 
irrelevant and inadmissible – citing copious authority for that stance – while 
Judge B would find the same language hopelessly confused and resort to 
context in order to resolve the confusion – likewise citing copious authority 
in support of that approach. Even more confusingly, one could find cases 
where two judges adopted the plain meaning approach, but contradicted 
one another on what that plain meaning was.15 
This type of confusion was manifestly undesirable. There is an obvious 
advantage – save possibly for those with ambitions to write books on 
contractual or statutory interpretation – to courts having a single reasonably 
clear standard by which to approach questions of interpretation, without the 
need to trawl through a mountain of inconsistent judgments and dicta. Far 
from settling matters, Coopers & Lybrand exacerbated the problems and led 
to further attempts to make sense of nearly a century of unruly and 
inconsistent authorities in which courts endeavoured to clarify the meaning 
of "intention of the parties (or legislature)", "plain meaning of words", 
"context", "surrounding circumstances", or the English derivative "the matrix 
of facts".16 The dam broke initially in that most technical of fields, the 
construction of patent specifications,17 and then in other cases in the SCA,18 
of which I single out in particular KPMG v Securefin. Of course, 
encouragement came from the Constitutional Court.19 So when it came to 
                                            
15  Compare the judgment of Heher AJA with the judgment in the court below in Van 
der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 6 SA 453 (SCA) paras 8 and 9. The judgment of Lewis 
AJA agreed with the result in the court below, but on the basis that the language was 
unclear and that contextual considerations dictated the outcome. Marais JA appears 
to have taken the view that the plain meaning was something different from that 
espoused by Heher AJA, although he did not endorse the expansive approach of 
Lewis AJA. 
16  Prenn v Simmons [1971] 3 All ER 237 (HL) 239. Cited with approval in Swart v Cape 
Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 195 (A) 201F and Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in 
Afrika (OVS) v Verenigende Gereformeerde Kerk in Suider-Afrika 1999 2 SA 156 
(SCA) 167B-D.  
17  Aktiebolaget Hässle v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 1 SA 155 (SCA) paras 8 and 9. 
18  Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 
2008 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 16-19; Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Murray & Roberts 
Construction (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 654 (SCA) para 7; KPMG Chartered Accountants 
(SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 4 SA 399 (SCA) para 39; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality v Germiston Municipal Retirement Fund 2010 2 SA 498 (SCA) paras 
12-14. 
19  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
para 90; Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 
M WALLIS  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
 
Endumeni the groundwork had been laid to essay a general statement of 
where our courts had arrived when it came to the approach to the 
interpretation of documents. 
In that sense commentators who say that Endumeni is not an earthquake 
rearranging the tectonic plates of the interpretation of documents are 
correct. Like Lord Hoffmann's summary in ICS20 it is rather more an 
endeavour to identify where the slowly shifting, grinding together of those 
tectonic plates has taken us.21 But that the configuration of the landscape is 
now different and that Coopers & Lybrand has properly been consigned to 
the history books22 is undeniable. That is apparent to anyone whose daily 
work is in the courts, where lengthy excursuses on statutory or contractual 
interpretation have given way to the citation of the summaries in Endumeni 
and Bothma-Batho, both in judgments and in heads of argument. I am 
conscious that, like Touchstone's ungallant comment about his wife,23 
Endumeni is "an ill-favoured thing, but mine own". Nonetheless my sense is 
that judges and counsel alike cite it with a sigh of relief in the belief that it 
enables them to get on with arguing or dealing with the issues that really 
concern the litigants.24 Its recent endorsement by the Constitutional Court 
should serve to emphasise that trend.25 
4 Others tread the same path 
The gradual shift away from a literal process of interpreting contracts and 
statutes to one where both text and context have a role to play is not 
confined to the UK and South Africa. The UK was perhaps in the forefront 
in the field of contractual interpretation with judgments such as Prenn v 
                                            
SA 199 (CC) para 52. On its face the summary in Cool Ideas para 28 appears to be 
a retrograde step from this perspective, but I doubt that this was intended. 
20  Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (hereafter 
the ICS case) [1998] 3 All ER 98 (HL) 114-115. 
21  A view shared by my colleague Lewis JA in Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading 
(Pty) Ltd 2016 1 SA 518 (SCA) para 28. She also concurred in my judgment in 
Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 
2014 2 SA 494 (SCA) (hereafter the Bothma-Batho case). 
22  Bothma-Batho paras 11 and 12. 
23  Shakespeare As You Like It Act 5, Scene 4.  
24  A search by one of the researchers at the SCA revealed that the Constitutional Court 
has cited it with approval on 16 occasions, often in conjunction with Cool Ideas, as 
well as 50 decisions of the SCA, and a number of decisions in the High Court and 
the Labour Court.  
25  Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd 2019 2 BCLR 165 
(CC) para 29. 
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Simmons,26 and ICS.27 The approach in those cases has not been expressly 
endorsed in the field of statutory interpretation, but the differences between 
the two seem small as appears from Lord Bingham's speech in 
Quintavalle:28 
Such is the skill of parliamentary draftsmen that most statutory enactments 
are expressed in language which is clear and unambiguous and gives rise to 
no serious controversy. But these are not the provisions which reach the 
courts, or at any rate the appellate courts. Where parties expend substantial 
resources arguing about the effect of a statutory provision it is usually because 
the provision is, or is said to be, capable of bearing two or more different 
meanings, or to be of doubtful application to the particular case which has now 
arisen, perhaps because the statutory language is said to be inapt to apply to 
it, sometimes because the situation which has arisen is one which the 
draftsman could not have foreseen and for which he has accordingly made no 
express provision. 
The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning 
of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not 
to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the 
particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only 
encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged 
to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may 
also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration 
of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment 
may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to 
achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure 
consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address 
some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the 
national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, 
is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions 
should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a 
whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its 
enactment.  
The same trend can be seen elsewhere. In Rizzo29 the Supreme Court of 
Canada approved the following statement of principle in respect of statutory 
interpretation: 
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act 
are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary 
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the 
intention of Parliament.30 
                                            
26  Prenn v Simmons [1971] 3 All ER 237 (HL). 
27  Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 3 All 
ER 98 (HL). 
28  R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 paras 7 and 8. 
Emphasis added. 
29  Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re) [1998] 1 SCR 27 (SCC). 
30  Quoting Driedger Construction of Statutes 87. 
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A broadly similar approach to the construction of contracts has also 
emerged in that jurisdiction, as courts have moved away from concepts of 
the plain meaning and technical rules of construction. The Supreme Court 
of Canada expressed this in Sattva Capital31 in the following terms: 
Regarding the first development, the interpretation of contracts has evolved 
towards a practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical 
rules of construction. The overriding concern is to determine 'the intent of the 
parties and the scope of their understanding'. To do so, a decision-maker must 
read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and 
grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known 
to the parties at the time of formation of the contract. Consideration of the 
surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention 
can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words alone do 
not have an immutable or absolute meaning: 'No contracts are made in a 
vacuum: there is always a setting in which they have to be placed. ... In a 
commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the 
commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge 
of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in 
which the parties are operating.' The meaning of words is often derived from 
a number of contextual factors, including the purpose of the agreement and 
the nature of the relationship created by the agreement. … As stated by Lord 
Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building 
Society, [1998] 1 All E.R. 98 (H.L.): 'The meaning which a document (or any 
other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as 
the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and 
grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words 
against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to 
mean.' 
A voyage to other countries leads to similar articulations of principle. In a 
2016 lecture, Justice Middleton of the Federal Court of Australia said:32 
Undoubtedly, there is a need for readily understandable and consistent 
principles to guide the interpretation of legislation. These principles should 
basically be guided by common sense and we should not be blinded by too 
many rules, over-analysis, or mechanical or scientific analysis. Trawling for 
rules and canons of interpretation is not the correct starting point. The starting 
point should always be to look at the words, their context, and the purpose of 
the legislation, then applying that to produce a result that is both fair and 
workable in the particular fact situation you have before you. 
Earlier adherence to the more traditional approach in regard to contractual 
interpretation33 - one that resonates with the judgment in Coopers & Lybrand 
                                            
31  Sattva Capital Corporation (Formerly Sattva Capital Inc v Cresston Moby 
Corporation (Formerly George Ventures Inc) [2014] SCR 633 paras 47 and 48. See 
aAlso see para 50. Sources omitted. 
32  Middleton 2016 http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/judges-speeches/ 
justice-middleton/middleton-j-20160414. 
33  Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 
CLR 337 352. 
M WALLIS  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  11 
 
- has given way to one where the approach to contracts and statutes is the 
same.34 In Byrnes v Kendle35 it was said: 
The approach taken to statutory construction is matched by that which is taken 
to contractual construction. Contractual construction depends on finding the 
meaning of the language of the contract – the intention which the parties 
expressed, not the subjective intentions which they may have had, but did not 
express. A contract means what a reasonable person having all the 
background knowledge of the 'surrounding circumstances' available to the 
parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract 
to mean. 
Other jurisdictions applying English common law have followed Lord 
Hoffmann's approach in ICS. This is true in New Zealand,36 which also 
applies a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes in the light of 
the text of the legislation and its purpose.37 Singapore follows suit with a 
statutory requirement that statutes be given a purposive interpretation and 
a contextual approach to contracts derived from England and the judgment 
in ICS.38 Malaysia does so also with a statutory obligation to give legislation 
a purposive construction and the same contextual approach to contracts.39 
Unsurprisingly Hong Kong has followed the route of ICS in a judgment of 
                                            
34  Justice Robert McDougall Construction of Contracts: The High Court's Approach, 
paper delivered to the Commercial Law Association Judges on 26 June 2015 
(McDougall 2015 
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/20
15%20Speeches/McDougall_20150626.pdf). The paper highlights nine judgments 
in which the approach of the High Court has moved in the same direction as South 
Africa and the United Kingdom, although it has not expressly disavowed Codelfa. 
See Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 804 
(HCA). See aAlso see Spigelman 2007 ALJ 322.  
35  Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253 para 98. See also Electricity Generation 
Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd 251 CLR 640 (HCA) para 35. 
36  Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2015] NZLR 432 para 60. One judge, 
Tipping J, has gone further and held that evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is 
admissible in the process of interpretation. See Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty 
Energy Ltd [2010] 2 NZLR 444 para 19 and Barber 2016 VUWLR 227. This goes 
further than is permitted in the UK. Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 
UKHL 38. 
37  Section 5(1) of the New Zeeland Interpretation Act 85 of 1999 and see Glazebrook 
2003 https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/Speech05-05-2003.pdf. 
38  Section 9A of the Singapore Interpretation Act 10 of 1965 as amended in 1993 and 
the address by Menon CJ entitled The Interpretation of Documents: Saying what 
they Mean or Meaning what they Say (Menon 2013 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/sjc/the-interpretation-of-documents---saying-what-they-mean-or-meaning-
what-they-say.pdf). As to contracts see Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-
Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR (R) 1029. 
39  Section 17A of the Malaysian Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 and see Rajah 2010 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&
gid=2705. 
M WALLIS  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  12 
 
Lord Hoffmann sitting in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.40 In regard 
to statutes, its approach is deliberately purposive and contextual.41  
The task of the academic community is similar to that of the tell-tales 
builders and engineers use to identify movement in buildings. Academics 
look to identify every faint hint of movement in the law. They parse the 
language of judgments (often in a very literal way) to sense where shifts in 
the law are occurring. In the field of interpretation there have been some 
suggestions that in the United Kingdom there has been a movement away 
from Lord Hoffmann back to the former position of giving far greater weight 
to the natural meaning of the words used in a contract.42 The shift was 
perceived to have occurred in Arnold v Britton,43 where it was suggested 
that the Supreme Court had moved away from Lord Hoffmann's approach 
in ICS, as approved in Rainy Sky,44 and reverted to a more literal reading of 
contracts. However, in Wood v Capita Insurance,45 the Supreme Court 
decisively shot down these suggestions. In para 13 Lord Hodge said: 
Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for 
exclusive occupation of the field of contractual interpretation. Rather, the 
lawyer and the judge, when interpreting any contract, can use them as tools 
to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have 
chosen to express their agreement. The extent to which each tool will assist 
the court in its task will vary according to the circumstances of the particular 
agreement or agreements. Some agreements may be successfully interpreted 
principally by textual analysis, for example because of their sophistication and 
complexity and because they have been negotiated and prepared with the 
assistance of skilled professionals. The correct interpretation of other 
                                            
40  Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd (1999) 3 HKLRD 757 (CFA) para 59 and 
Fully Profit (Asia) Ltd v Secretary for Justice (2013) 16 HKEC 139 (CA) para 15 (per 
Ma CJ). 
41  Medical Council of Hong Kong v Chow Siu Shek David [2000] 2 HKC 428 438F. 
42  Myburgh 2017 SALJ 519; Hutchinson 2017 SALJ 310. The perception of a retreat 
was not confined to South Africa. See Goddard and Johnson 2017 
https://www.atkinchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Contractual-
Interpretation-Article-February-2017.pdf. 
43  Arnold v Britton [2016] 1 All ER 1 (SC) paras 15 to 23. 
44  Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2012] 1 All ER 1137 (SC) para 21 where Lord Clarke 
of Stone-under-Ebony said that: "… the exercise of construction is essentially one 
unitary exercise in which the court must consider the language used and ascertain 
what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge 
which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which 
they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have 
meant. In doing so, the court must have regard to all the relevant surrounding 
circumstances. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer 
the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the 
other." 
45  Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] 4 All ER 615 (SC) paras 8-13. The 
method of interpretation that blends text and context is well-illustrated by the 
exposition of principle in the judgment of Lord Hodge in Barnardo's v 
Buckinghamshire [2018] UKSC 55 paras 13-18 and the analysis in paras 19-29. 
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contracts may be achieved by a greater emphasis on the factual matrix, for 
example because of their informality, brevity or the absence of skilled 
professional assistance. But negotiators of complex formal contracts may 
often not achieve a logical and coherent text because of, for example, the 
conflicting aims of the parties, failures of communication, differing drafting 
practices, or deadlines which require the parties to compromise in order to 
reach agreement. There may often therefore be provisions in a detailed 
professionally drawn contract which lack clarity and the lawyer or judge in 
interpreting such provisions may be particularly helped by considering the 
factual matrix and the purpose of similar provisions in contracts of the same 
type. The iterative process, of which Lord Mance spoke in Sigma Finance 
Corpn … assists the lawyer or judge to ascertain the objective meaning of 
disputed provisions. 
On this approach, the process of interpretation is no longer, assuming it 
once was, a war between textualism and contextualism. I venture to suggest 
that this does not differ materially from Endumeni. Both text and context 
have a role to play, and which will predominate will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. 
5 Text and context 
Let me expand briefly on the role of text and context. In a famous lecture 
Lord Steyn illustrated his well-known statement that "In law context is 
everything"46 by reference to the story of Tamerlane, or Timur the Lame, the 
Turco-Mongolian emperor born in modern Uzbekhistan, when besieging the 
Turkish city of Sivas. The defending soldiers said they would surrender if he 
promised not to shed a drop of blood. Tamerlane agreed and then buried 
the soldiers alive, saying that he had kept his promise exactly.47 
Lord Steyn used the story to illustrate his contention that literalism or, as we 
would now call it, textualism in the interpretation of legal documents is not a 
good thing. But classical tales do not point in only one direction and he 
overlooked an even more famous illustration drawn from Shakespeare's 
play The Merchant of Venice. The story is of a merchant, Antonio, who 
borrows money from the moneylender, Shylock. It is a thoroughly anti-
Semitic story, but that is not relevant to the point I want to make. As security 
Antonio had given a bond that, if he did not repay the debt, the moneylender 
might take a pound of flesh from his chest. Antonio's lawyer, Portia, pleaded 
for mercy, but when the plea fell on deaf ears she said, go ahead, your bond 
entitles you to your pound of flesh. And then she added: "But the bond says 
nothing about any blood. Take your pound of flesh, but if you spill a drop of 
                                            
46  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433 
(HL) para 28. 
47  Steyn 1997 LQR 440-441. 
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blood in doing so, you are in breach of the bond and will forfeit all your 
property". Shylock abandons his claim. A more successful invocation of the 
plain meaning of the text is hard to imagine. 
This illustrates the point that sometimes language and syntax, and 
sometimes context, will predominate. Endumeni does away with the idea in 
Coopers & Lybrand that interpretation is an exercise that occurs in stages. 
The starting point is the text, because as the writer Elena Ferrante 
expresses it: "The words, the grammar, the syntax are a chisel that shapes 
our thought."48 But from the outset that is viewed in context, so that the 
process is both textual and contextual. 
There will be some cases, though they are likely to be few,49 where the 
language admits of only one meaning, in which event no amount of reliance 
on context can avoid that meaning. In my experience, the ingenuity of 
counsel can usually find arguments favouring an alternative meaning, 
however unlikely they might seem in the light of the grammar and syntax of 
the provision under consideration. Then context will come into play to a 
greater or lesser extent. The clearer the language used in the text and the 
more obvious its meaning in accordance with the ordinary understanding of 
language, the less the influence of context in arriving at a conclusion as to 
its meaning. The more possible meanings there are and the more finely 
balanced they are, the more powerful will be the influence of contextual 
factors in the ultimate decision. In construing legislation or developing the 
common law the influence of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights is an essential part of the context.50 But there is a line to be drawn 
beyond which the interpreter cannot go. Context cannot be used to create 
a meaning that the language, when viewed in context, is incapable of 
bearing. That is not interpretation. It is contractual or legislative drafting. 
                                            
48  Ferrante 2018 https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/feb/24/elena-
ferrante-on-italian-language-identity. The preceding sentence reads: "A language is 
a compendium of the history, geography, material and spiritual life, the vices and 
virtues, not only of those who speak it, but also of those who have spoken it through 
the centuries". 
49  Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Bosch 2015 2 SA 174 (SCA) para 
9. As Lord Bingham said in Quintavalle such cases do not usually come before the 
courts and certainly not the higher courts. 
50  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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6 The road ahead 
6.1 Objective interpretation 
Some aspects of Endumeni have raised questions. The one relates to the 
notion that the process of interpretation is objective. This appears to have 
occasioned some uncertainty in academic minds, but I think that to the 
members of the judiciary it simply means that they are concerned with 
interpreting the language used in the document, be it contract or statute or 
whatever, and not trying to go behind it to any unwritten and unexpressed 
intention that the legislature or the parties may have had in formulating the 
document. In other words, it stands in contradistinction to the notion that the 
search is for a subjective intention of the legislature or the contracting 
parties not apparent from the words used in the document in the light of the 
relevant context. If the words have inaccurately expressed that intention, 
rectification is the mechanism to remedy this. The legislature can remedy 
omissions and misspeaking by way of amendment. 
There are no great subtleties here and most judges and practitioners would 
be baffled by its description as "subjective objectivity",51 merely because the 
reader engages in interpretation in the light of context. The use of the word 
"objective" to describe the process merely reinforces the point that the 
court's task is to construe the language used in the contract or legislation 
and not to seek for unexpressed meanings discerned or, as Kentridge AJ 
once said, "divined" from other sources. In passing, I should perhaps say 
that this has very little to do with the fact that our law adopts a broadly 
subjective approach to the formation of contracts, that is, that they are 
created as a result of the agreement ("wilsooreenstemming") of the 
parties.52 Interpretation is the process that occurs after formation of the 
contract. It is overwhelmingly undertaken in relation to a written record of 
those prior actions and involves attributing meaning to a written text. It is not 
concerned with whether specific conduct creates a contract. 
6.2 Context in contract 
The next point is how a court addresses context. No hard and fast rule can 
be laid down in this regard because circumstances differ from case to case. 
But it makes no sense to treat the contracts of large commercial 
organisations such as banks as having been drafted to deal with specific 
factual circumstances, when one knows that they are generic contracts 
                                            
51  Hutchinson 2017 SALJ 305 fn 21. 
52  Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 993E-F. 
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drafted to cover a variety of situations and taken out of the stationery 
cupboard by subordinate officials with little or no discretion to vary their 
terms. Standard form contracts are widely used in modern commerce, 
examples being sale or lease agreements, contracts of loan, insurance 
policies, arbitration agreements, bills of lading and charter-parties, 
construction contracts, deeds of suretyship and so on. These are referred 
to as contracts of adhesion53 because they are usually concluded on a "take 
it or leave it" basis, rather than as a result of a process of negotiation and 
agreement. To look at them as having a specific context arising from the 
identity or needs of the one individual contracting party rather than the 
organisation that caused the terms to be formulated is misleading. The 
purpose of the contract and the nature of the relationship it creates will be 
relevant, as will be the market in which it applies, but beyond that there is 
no meaningful fact-specific context.54 In interpreting such contracts the role 
of external facts to provide context is likely to be small. 
The contracts of individuals and small businesses will often be different and 
less carefully formulated, especially where prepared by lay people. Here the 
likelihood of facts specific to the parties and their arrangements being 
relevant to the interpretation of the agreement is greater. Their 
contemplation will potentially have a greater impact. This emphasises the 
proposition that the more formal and careful the drafting, the less the need 
to look to extrinsic factors. Error is not lightly assumed, although that may 
not be the case where the evidence reveals that the contract was drafted in 
haste or by persons lacking legal training and drafting skills. Likewise 
superfluity is not assumed, but that is not to be confused with verbosity, 
which is ever present. Particular care must be taken by courts not to reverse 
the consequences of a hard-fought process of bargaining, or to relieve 
parties of risks that they decided to run in order to secure gains elsewhere. 
In the result, in a detailed commercial contract the context will be provided 
largely by the nature and purpose of the transaction in question and the 
economic and commercial background to its conclusion. A loan from a bank 
is plainly different from a loan from a friend. Where there is disproportionate 
bargaining power, this must be recognised, as must the reasons for 
commercial organisations’ wishing to standardise the terms of their 
business dealings with the general public. And, curiously enough, judges 
are human and reluctant to impose burdens that seem harsh and unfair on 
                                            
53  See the discussion by Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 
135-139, 151-157. 
54  Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co [2016] 2 SCR 23 
paras 24, 27-32. 
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the weaker and disadvantaged members of society. So fairness and equity 
is part of the context. 
6.3 Context in legislation 
When dealing with a statute, context does not involve guesswork as to the 
intention of the legislature, but a reasoned assessment of the broad purpose 
underlying its enactment. Statutes directed at ameliorating a distinct social 
problem are entitled to a more generous construction, given that purpose,55 
than a technical regulatory statute such as the Companies Act.56 Nor can it 
mean, for example, that in a taxing statute a construction favourable to the 
revenue must be given because the purpose of the statute is to raise 
revenue. But anti-avoidance measures may be entitled to more generous 
consideration than the provisions defining what is taxable. 
In a recent minority judgment in the SCA57 the application to legislation of 
the interpretational approach in Endumeni is questioned. It relies on the 
distinction drawn in modern linguistic philosophy between sentence 
meaning – the meaning of the words in the text – and speaker meaning – 
the meaning that can be attributed to the speaker of those words by an 
examination of the context and the circumstances which gave rise to the 
document. The point is pertinently and correctly raised that there is a 
fundamental difference between the process by which a contract comes into 
force, either as a result of negotiation between bargaining parties, or by 
adhesion in consequence of the weaker bargaining party's need for the 
goods or services supplied, and the legislative process. From this it is 
suggested that context is fact specific and "can be applied to the 
interpretation of contracts and like documents, but not of statutes". 
The approach strikes me as unusual, for courts here and elsewhere have 
repeatedly claimed that they had regard to context in construing statutes.58 
The so-called "mischief" rule, where the court construes the language 
against the background of the perceived mischief that the statute 
addresses, is an obvious example. Where a statute is the product of a 
commission of enquiry it is permissible for a court to have regard to the 
report of the commission to ascertain the mischief at which the legislation 
                                            
55  Looyen v Simmer & Jack Mines Ltd 1952 4 SA 547 (A) 554; Slims (Pty) Ltd v Morris 
1988 1 SA 715 (A) 734. 
56  Companies Act 73 of 2008. 
57  CSARS v Daikin Air Conditioning 2018 ZASCA 66 (25 May 2018) paras 31-35. 
58  Glazebrook 2003 https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/Speech05-05-
2003.pdf. 
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was aimed and the view then held of the existing state of the law.59 The 
explanatory memorandum prepared by the committee that drafted the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 199560 has been referred to on countless 
occasions as providing relevant context to the provisions of the LRA.61  
Then there is the context provided by the content of the legislation as a 
whole. This is invariably relevant because of the provision in the definition 
section of all statutes that the definitions will apply "unless the context 
otherwise indicates". This provision was considered by the SCA in Hoban62 
where it was described in the following way: 
'Context' includes the entire enactment in which the word or words in 
contention appear … and in its widest sense would include enactments in pari 
materia and the situation, or 'mischief', sought to be remedied. … That is the 
first point. The second is that there is no justification for the distinction, so 
heavily relied on by the learned Judge, between linguistic context and 
legislative intention. The moment one has to analyse context in order to 
determine whether a meaning is to be given which differs from the defined 
meaning one is immediately engaged in ascertaining legislative intention. One 
remains so engaged until the interpretation process is concluded. It is only 
concluded when legislative intention is established. As remarked by E 
Cameron in Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa vol 27 at 207 para 229,'… 
'context does no more than reflect legislative meaning which in turn is capable 
of being expressed only through words in context'. 
Legislative history is another source of relevant context that can be of great 
assistance in resolving problems of interpretation and can on occasions 
prove decisive in clarifying what is otherwise obscure.63 The provisions of 
the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 operate as interpretative guides in certain 
situations, and finally section 39(2) of the Constitution contains the 
injunction that legislation must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. So, as with all law, the Constitution 
provides a context for its interpretation that cannot be avoided and will 
plainly affect the meaning of specific provisions, even though its terms may 
not specifically address the problem under consideration. It provides the 
norms by and through which the interpretative process is undertaken. 
Looking at another field, that straddles those of legislation and contract, or 
more accurately agreement in the broad sense, because we are not dealing 
with contractually enforceable undertakings, the approach to the 
                                            
59  Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 
SA 555 (A) 562A-563A. 
60  Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 278. 
61  See, for example Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 
94, fn 100 
62  Hoban v Absa Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 1999 2 SA 1036 (SCA) para 20. 
63  Santam Insurance Ltd v Taylor 1985 1 SA 514 (A) 526-527B. 
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construction of treaties in the form of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention64 requires them to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of their object and purpose". If international 
agreements are to be construed in the light of context, it is legitimate to ask 
why domestic legislation should lack context for the purposes of 
interpretation. Context in the form of the travaux preparatoires and other 
material such as historical background is used to interpret treaties, whether 
free standing or, as is required in South Africa, by section 231(2) of the 
Constitution after it has been adopted into domestic law. There are several 
statutes incorporating such conventions into domestic law: for example, the 
Carriage by Air Act 17 of 1946, incorporating by section 3 thereof the 
provisions of the Montreal Convention, in the form of the schedule to the 
statute, and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986, making the 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules applicable to the carriage of goods 
from South African ports. Although South Africa is not a party to the Vienna 
Convention, section 233 of the Constitution requires courts where possible 
to construe all law in accordance with international law.  
While I am hesitant to become involved in the field of linguistic philosophy, 
where others may feel more at home than I, it seems to me that the notion 
of speaking meaning65 may apply differently and possibly with greater force 
and effect in the context of conversation and the human interactions that 
characterise conversation, than when interpreting written texts. Importantly, 
it serves the purpose of identifying how in conversation externalities outside 
the words used by the speaker contribute to the hearer's understanding of 
what is said. In the context of written texts, the same is true, but the nature 
of the externalities that contribute to understanding will vary from instance 
to instance. The nature of the document and its purpose, i.e. whether it sets 
rules to govern a relationship in the case of contract or rules to govern 
society in the case of legislation, provide an important part of those 
externalities. 
So, while I agree that the manner in which a court determines the meaning 
of a statute will differ from the manner in which it will approach a contract,66 
                                            
64  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). The definition of a treaty in Art 
1(a) of the Convention makes it plain that it includes both treaties and conventions 
that have entered into force. 
65  First articulated, as I understand it, by Paul Grice, although he used the expression 
"conversational implicature". See Grandy and Warner 2017 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/grice/. 
66  CSARS v Daikin Air Conditioning 2018 ZASCA 66 (25 May 2018) para 33. 
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that is not - it seems to me - because legislation lacks a speaker meaning, 
but because the nature and purpose of the document and the relevant 
context are different. It does not, I think, undermine the basic point of 
Endumeni that text and context go together in the process of interpretation; 
that one starts with the language and the rules of grammar and syntax, but 
always viewed in the light of the context, the apparent purpose of the 
document and, where there is relevant knowledge, the material known to 
those responsible for its coming into existence. This is not confined to 
contracts. Even legislators and the officials who are initially responsible for 
the drafting of legislation are aware of external facts that lead to legislation 
being passed. 
6.4 Sense and sensibility 
One other point worth mentioning is that Endumeni is not an invitation to 
judges to impose their life experience on the parties or the statutory 
material. Context must be apparent from the material placed before the 
court or matters in regard to which it is legitimate to take judicial notice, that 
is, matters of relatively common knowledge. That is as true of knowledge of 
commercial matters as it is of the history and problems of society and 
anything else coming before a court of law. So in making use of context the 
judge must be sure that the context on which reliance is to be placed is of 
this character, not a matter of personal belief, experience, predilection or 
prejudice. 
Let me deal in greater detail with commercial sensibility. That is an 
expression to be found in the English judgments, which focus particularly 
on commercial contracts. It is not an expression used in Endumeni. What I 
said was that a sensible construction was to be preferred to one that was 
insensible or unbusinesslike. And provided judges heed the warning that 
followed, that it is not for them to impose their personal sense of what would 
be sensible or desirable in place of what the parties to the contract or the 
legislative body have actually said, this should not be problematic. 
When one speaks of preferring a sensible result to an insensible one, the 
standard is not one that is personal to the views of the judge. Instead it is 
far more general and involves a broader assessment of what would be 
regarded as sensible by society in that situation. In the case of legislation 
the temptation is to supplement what the legislature has said with what the 
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judge thinks it should have said. Wilson CJ pointed out the fallacy in this a 
century ago, in Richardson v Austin, in the following terms:67 
… as to the argument from the assumed intention of the legislature, there is 
nothing more dangerous and fallacious in interpreting a Statute than first of all 
to assume that the legislature had a particular intention, and then, having 
made up one's mind what that intention was, to conclude that that intention 
must necessarily be expressed in the Statute, and then proceed to find it. 
When one speaks of a contract being unbusinesslike, the danger of course 
lies in failing to resist the temptation to rescue one party from the 
consequences of a bad bargain, but I would have thought that it was clear 
that this is not the judicial role. Judges can do a lot to ensure fairness in 
society, but they do so within the framework we call the law and their room 
for manoeuvre is not unlimited. So avoiding an unbusinesslike result 
addresses the likelihood that reasonable persons would not commit 
themselves to a contractual relationship that holds benefit only to one side 
and disadvantage only to the other. Of course, there are contracts where 
that is so and, within the bounds of public policy, the courts must enforce 
them.68 But in the ordinary course most contracts are concluded on a basis 
that appears to hold out benefits to both sides of the relationship, so it is 
legitimate to construe them with that in mind. 
7 Conclusion 
What are the underlying principles that animate the judgment in Endumeni? 
The first is that we need to escape from an approach to interpretation that 
involves an a priori assessment of the meaning of the document in issue 
and then an endeavour, by invoking whichever canons of interpretation suit, 
to justify that meaning. It serves as a check on the tendency, to which we 
are all prey, to reason backwards from a desired or a priori conclusion to 
the justification for that conclusion. 
Endumeni demands of judges that they articulate their reasons, both 
linguistic and contextual, for arriving at their decisions on questions of the 
construction of documents. As such it should produce greater transparency 
in regard to judicial decision-making in this sphere. Once judges treat it as 
second nature to explain the contextual material on which they rely, it will 
be possible to assess whether that reliance is legitimate or unjustified. It will 
enable the litigants and appellate courts to determine whether that material 
                                            
67  Richardson v Austin (1911) 12 CLR 463 470. See also see Lewison Interpretation of 
Contracts para 2.06 for similar statements. Bishop and Brickhill 2012 SALJ 681 have 
suggested that the Constitutional Court has been guilty of the same fault.  
68  As the Supreme Court did in Arnold v Britton [2016] 1 All ER 1 (SC). 
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was properly before the judge and whether it provided a complete picture 
from which it was permissible to draw the conclusions in question. 
The second animating principle is that it is desirable to have a single 
reasonably clear standard for the interpretation of documents that enables 
lawyers and courts to go about their business of interpreting documents, 
without becoming bogged down in the "how" of interpretation. 
There are areas of interpretation that are untouched by the contents of this 
paper, which has concentrated on contracts and statutes, rather than other 
areas of law. Perhaps the most obvious omission is the fertile field of the 
construction of wills and the extent to which the Endumeni approach to 
interpretation can be adapted to that situation.69 That is a particular 
omission, given that in articulating his golden rule Lord Wensleydale 
specifically said that it applied to "wills and, indeed statutes and all written 
instruments". Wills are of course unilateral documents, but so are statutes, 
patent specifications and judgments, yet they all demand a broadly similar 
approach. But the field is special and encumbered by a considerable 
number of terms and concepts that are technical and have a special 
meaning deserving of lengthier and more detailed consideration than is 
feasible in this article. 
Lastly, to those who may think it is their academic obligation to pore over 
this paper to discern new approaches, or detect a retreat from previous 
standpoints, may I implore them to approach the task with the following 
understanding, namely, that:70 
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, … having regard to the context provided by reading the particular 
provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the 
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature 
of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light 
of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known 
to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is 
possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The 
process is objective not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to 
one that leads to insensible … results or undermines the apparent purpose of 
the document. … [B]e alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute 
what [you] regard as reasonable [or] sensible for the words actually used [for] 
to do so is to cross the divide between interpretation and [divination]. … The 
'inevitable point of departure is the language … itself', read in context and 
                                            
69  In Raubenheimer v Raubenheimer 2012 5 SA 290 (SCA) para 21 the court applied 
contractual principles governing the implication of terms in contracts to the 
implication of a term in a will. 
70  Endumeni para 18. 
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having regard to [its] purpose … and the background to the preparation and 
production of [this] document. 
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